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CHINA'S CRISIS DEEPENS AS JAPANESE SURRENDER TALKS PROCEED

ALTHOUGH Japan is a defeated nation, the ruling clique in Tokyo is not accepting that fact as final. As the process of concluding a formal surrender moves forward, the imperial régime is shrewdly seeking to preserve its power and lay the basis for a revival of militarism at a later date. Like the defeated Nazis, Japan's overlords have but one regret: that they lost. Their actions since the acceptance of the Potsdam ultimatum reveal unmistakably their desire to retain as much of the old order as possible and to impede the victorious Allies. The similarity between the new cabinet under Prince Higashi-Kuni and the short-lived administration of Admiral Doenitz in Germany is all too clear; for the objective of the new cabinet is not to launch Japan along a new path of peaceful development, but to consolidate the position of the ruling groups in their moment of supreme crisis.

It may be taken for granted that General MacArthur is aware of the intentions of the Japanese leaders. His immediate problem, however, is to effectuate the conclusion of surrender terms as rapidly as possible, to land forces in Japan with a minimum of difficulty and incident, and to establish a smoothly operating administration in the Japanese home islands. The decision to use the Emperor for the time being to issue our orders to the Japanese people and armies was wise, for it means the saving of many thousands of American lives that would have been lost in an invasion of Japan. Nevertheless, within the framework of existing policy, it will be necessary to curb the present Japanese leaders and bring about changes in personnel as soon as we are in a position to do so.

WHO DEFEATED WHOM? The trend of thought among Japan's leaders is indicated unmistakably in statements by the Emperor and the new Premier. Apparently afraid and unwilling to

reveal to the Japanese people the full meaning of unconditional surrender and the responsibility of the government for what has happened, they seem to be acting almost as if the war had ended by common consent among the belligerents. In a rescript of August 15, for example, Emperor Hirohito justified the attack on the United States and Britain, repeated Japan's wartime propaganda theme about "the emancipation of East Asia," and suggested that Japan's problem from now on is to "keep pace with the progress of the world" (presumably, first of all, in the field of science).

The Emperor's statement on the origins of the war is instructive, for the idea that he was opposed to the attack on Pearl Harbor finds no support in his assertion that "we declared war on America and Britain out of our sincere desire to insure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement." In a second rescript of August 17, asking Japanese troops to surrender, the Emperor said he believed that "the loyalty and achievements of you officers and men will for all time be the quintessence of the nation." In another message, issued a few hours later, Premier Higashi-Kuni spoke of "enhancing the lofty spirit of the Imperial Japanese Army."

EFFORTS TO DIVIDE ALLIES. It may well be argued that, to induce the Japanese forces on many far-flung fronts to lay down their arms, and to avoid disorder in Japan at the time of occupation, language of this sort is necessary. But the statements seem to go far beyond anything that expediency might dictate, and efforts to divide the United Nations even in the hour of Japan's defeat testify to the fundamental motives involved. While avoiding any specific reference to Japan's attitude toward the Big Three,

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Higashi-Kuni in a speech of August 17 referred to "the regrettable relations of the past with China" and said that improvement "will not be limited to just Japanese-Chinese relations, but will affect our proclamation which stressed the liberation of East Asia." It is not fanciful to see in these remarks a first move toward competing with the Big Three for the future favor of China and reasserting the idea of Japan's leadership in the Far East.

CIVIL WAR IN CHINA? Since the effectiveness of political warfare is always closely related to the military force behind it, the Japanese maneuvers are more important as warnings for the future than as immediate threats. In China, however, there are political problems of immediate significance: the rapidly deteriorating state of affairs between Chungking and Yen'an is bringing China to the edge of civil war at the moment of victory, and the laying down of arms by the Japanese troops may be the signal for a tragic internal conflict. On the other hand, the domestic and external factors working against long-term warfare are considerable, for it is doubtful whether either the Chinese people or the Big Three are in a mood to tolerate the vivisection of China following Japan's defeat. Never in its recent history has China had so glorious an opportunity to improve its position and carry forward the work of national construction, but the unavoidable prerequisite is the achievement of national unity.

The present Kuomintang-Communist conflict has its roots in the past two decades of Chinese history, but the immediate occasion for difficulty is the surrender of the Japanese armies. To the extent that either side in China wins the large cities still occupied by the Japanese and takes over the arms of the Japanese troops, it will be greatly strengthened in the struggle for power. On August 12 Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Communists to "remain at their posts and wait for further directions," instead of carrying out plans to accept the surrender of Japanese troops in their territory. But this had no effect, and two days later Yen'an broadcast a message to Chiang from Chu Teh, the Communist Commander-in-Chief, contrasting the order to the Communists to halt action with another order by the Generalissimo urging "officers and men in the various war zones to intensify your war efforts and actively push forward without the slightest relaxation."

On August 16 Chiang invited Mao Tse-tung, top

leader of the Chinese Communists, to come to Chungking for discussions. Three days later Chu Teh telegraphed a series of demands to the Generalissimo, summarizing the position taken by Yen'an in recent weeks. Chu asked that Chungking and Yen'an reach agreement on accepting the surrender of puppet and Japanese troops, as well as on any pacts and treaties concluded after surrender. The Communists, he said, should receive the right to accept the surrender of troops in areas under their control; to be represented at the Allied acceptance of Japan's surrender; and to participate in the post-war control of Japan, the peace conference and future United Nations conferences. He demanded that the existing "one-party dictatorship" be abolished and a conference of all parties be convened to establish a "democratic, coalition government." Central troops blockading Communist areas were to be removed, and democratic reforms were to be instituted throughout China.

WHAT WILL U.S. AND U.S.S.R. DO? It is obvious that the differences inside China cannot be settled peacefully by the parties involved, for their enmities are too old, too sharp and too fundamental. It is also clear that neither party is in a position to destroy the other except through prolonged civil war, and perhaps not even then. Any solution must be based on the assumption that both Chungking and Yen'an are part of China's political life. If a compromise is ultimately to be reached, the assistance of the Big Three, and especially the United States and the Soviet Union, will be needed. In fact, nothing is more important than that these powers should come to a common understanding on the issues involved.

It is clearly impossible for the powers to create a ready-made formula for adjusting the Chinese situation, since the terms of any settlement of differences must come from inside China. What the powers can do is to extend their advice and assistance where it will do the most good and to avoid all actions tending to promote friction in China. The recently announced agreement between Chungking and Moscow, the text of which has not yet been made public, may enable the Russians to contribute to political improvement in China. It is also deeply in the interest of the United States that civil war be averted, or promptly halted, if it breaks out.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

HOW WILL BRITAIN AND FRANCE REACT TO NEW BALANCE OF POWER?

The need for statesmanship to keep pace with revolutionary changes in environment, such as those which have so recently been ushered in by the atomic bomb and the still more destructive weapons foreshadowed by General H. H. Arnold on August 17, has never been greater than at the present mo-

ment. And nowhere is the necessity for comprehending the implications of these changes more obvious than in Europe. For distances on the continent have now shrunk so noticeably that the concept of strategic boundaries or barriers behind which nations might withdraw for security has become a hopeless

anachronism. Moreover, the premium placed by the new weapons of war on scientific research and industrial potential has done much to shift the centers of world power from Europe to the United States and Russia. As a result of these far-reaching changes, Britain and France, particularly, must reexamine their thinking on foreign policy, honestly assess their strength and weakness, and on that basis seek new roles in world affairs. Yet signs that such self-examination has thus far been conducted in London and Paris are few, and current British and French reactions to the new German and eastern European settlement sketched at Potsdam by the first peace conference are, for the most part, following strictly traditional lines of policy.

BRITAIN FEARS DIVIDED EUROPE. Although Britain was a full partner to the Potsdam decisions, both Winston Churchill, as leader of the Opposition, and Prime Minister Attlee expressed uneasiness during the first session of the new Parliament on August 16 about present conditions in eastern Europe and the Balkans. It was hardly surprising that Churchill referred to "the possible divergence of view which exists inevitably between the victors about the state of affairs in Eastern and Middle Europe," and hinted at tragic events behind the "iron curtain which at present divides Europe in twain." The former Prime Minister's on-guard attitude toward Russian expansion in Europe is well-known. Similarly, Churchill's opinion that the provisional western frontier agreed upon for Poland—which includes one-fourth of the arable land of Germany—goes "far beyond what necessity or equity requires," reveals his opposition to a boundary settlement which, in effect, places the Russian frontier on the Oder.

But the fact that Prime Minister Attlee, as spokesman for the Labor government, expressed his agreement with Churchill about "the abomination of police rule" is more significant. This statement indicates that Britain, despite its shift toward the left, retains its traditional opposition to the consolidation of a large part of Europe under any single power, regardless of which power that may be. This does not mean that Britain is hypocritical in championing the rights of the small nations that have been added to the Russian sphere in eastern Europe, although Britain—like other powers—has not hesitated to suppress popular movements in various territories throughout the world when they seemed to run counter to Britain's security. Instead, it indicates that Britain continues to believe that in the future, as in the past, its best chance of preventing the control of Europe by one great power lies in a policy of supporting the democratic rights of the small nations.

Yet an air of unreality hangs over Britain's professed policy of establishing the "perfect freedom"

for European peoples that Prime Minister Attlee defined as the goal of the Foreign Office. For the British are acutely aware of the limitations on their power to intervene in the internal affairs of other states in order to establish this freedom. Instead, therefore, of insisting on European conditions that Britain would consider perfect, both the Labor and Conservative leaders agree that compromises must be accepted. Lest these compromises become the prelude to appeasement and steady decline, however, Britain is exploring possibilities of cooperating with the Commonwealth, the other great powers and western Europe, with a view to strengthening its hand. It seems, in fact, that the recent election indicated widespread determination on the part of the British to secure a government capable of appealing to large masses of people in the western European democracies, rather than a Tory régime that depended on conservative elements which commanded little support in their respective countries.

Whether the new Labor government succeeds in winning significant support for Britain in western Europe is largely dependent on the success of its present overtures to France. Harold J. Laski, chairman of the British Labor party's National Executive, told the French Socialist party's congress on August 12 that he hoped for a big Socialist victory in France in the October elections as a basis for Anglo-French cooperation. But even if this attempt meets with success, the British are well aware that they still will have done little to guarantee their future security. Thus far, no one in Britain, or for that matter in any of the victorious nations, has tackled the basic problem of maintaining peace under the new conditions created by recent scientific advances. It is former Prime Minister Churchill, however, who has the distinction of having stated the problem more clearly than any other leader. During the next few years, as he has declared, "We must remold the relationships of all men of all nations in such a way that these men do not wish, or dare, to fall upon each other . . . and that international bodies by supreme authority may give peace on earth and justice among men."

FRANCE SEEKS U.S. AID. For the French, too, the new distribution of world power that has such profound implications not only for France but Europe as a whole, is a source of great concern. Until very recently, however, the immediate tasks of reconstruction, together with the problem of Germany, so completely preoccupied French leaders that they tended to lose sight of the long-range problems posed by their country's relative decline among the powers. As a result, recent French foreign policy has sometimes seemed motivated by a desire to revive the plans of Foch and Clemenceau at the close of

World War I, just as though the strategic concepts of twenty-five years ago were still useful today. For example, French spokesmen have expressed dissatisfaction with the Potsdam decisions on Germany because they left the Rhineland and Ruhr within the borders of a united Germany instead of complying with the French view that the Rhineland, at least, should be transformed into a buffer state against a possibly resurgent enemy.

Since the news of the atomic bomb and the establishment of American supremacy in the Far East as a result of Japan's collapse has reached France, the French press and official circles have apparently been even more greatly impressed by the rapid rise of American power than they were last year when American troops landed on French soil. Grasping the importance of the New World in the era that is now beginning, General de Gaulle, who arrived in Washington on August 22 to talk to President Truman, appears determined to forge a close bond between France and the United States. For it is only by means of such a bond that de Gaulle can solve two of his nation's most pressing current problems. The first of these, the need for economic aid to restore French industrial strength, can be met only by a steady flow of raw materials and tools from the United States. On the basis of the trend toward greatly increased American shipments of civilian supplies to France since V-E day—the shipments made during July and August having been nearly as great as those of the entire preceding six-month period—French prospects of American economic support are good. The second problem regarding which France needs American cooperation is that of the French colonies in the Far East, notably Indo-China. In view of the suspicion with which French leaders

have long regarded Washington's attitude toward Indo-China, it may seem ironical that General de Gaulle is now turning to the United States for aid in dispatching French troops and administrative officials to this colony. Since, however, Chinese and British troops, rather than American forces, stand on the borders of Indo-China, and China and Britain are apparently prepared to occupy the country, it appears that France is seeking the mediation of the United States as the least unsatisfactory solution to its foremost imperial problem.

PÉTAİN—SYMBOL OF FRENCH WEAKNESS. The trial of Marshal Pétain, culminating in his conviction on August 15 on charges of intelligence with the enemy, has formed a kind of postscript to the four bitter years when France was linked to Hitler's New Order and deprived of its long-established leadership throughout Europe. The jury that heard the evidence against the leader of the Vichy régime and found him guilty of treason was, by its own admission, a political jury. As such, its members were determined to hold up Pétain as the symbol of France's weakness in 1940, when the Marshal and a number of other French military and political leaders were convinced Germany would win the war, and to punish him for a lack of faith in ultimate French victory. Since American participation in the war—belated though it was from the French point of view—has played such an important part in proving Pétain's judgment wrong, it was particularly appropriate that his sentence, which was subsequently commuted from death to life imprisonment by General de Gaulle, was handed down on the day American and Allied power triumphed over Japan.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

Nippon: The Crime and Punishment of Japan, by Willis Lamott. New York, John Day, 1944. \$2.50.

A well-informed, clearly conceived analysis of the causes of Japanese aggression and the principles to be followed in dealing with Japan after defeat. Warning against the danger of "political scene-shifting" by present leaders in Tokyo, the author declares that "no government set up by the ruling classes of Japan in order to deal with the victors after the war can be trusted."

The Economic Development of French Indo-China, by Charles Robequain. New York, Oxford University Press, 1944. \$4.00.

A translation of an authoritative French study of Indo-Chinese economic life, published in France in 1939. Developments during 1939-45 are discussed in a supplementary section.

America's Far Eastern Policy, by T. A. Bisson. New York, Macmillan and Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945. \$3.00.

A valuable survey of American diplomacy in Asia, particularly in the period since 1931. An appendix contains leading documents on our Far Eastern relations from September 1937 through the Cairo conference.

China Among the Powers, by David Nelson Rowe. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1945. \$2.00.

The author examines the factors making for military power and reaches the conclusion that "for at least twenty-five years after the present war" China is very unlikely to "develop such technical capacity as to allow her to rely primarily on her own strength to guarantee her security." This book is an important aid to clear thinking on Chinese problems.

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